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Empirical and Dialogical Proofs of God’s Existence in Laws 101 
 
Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Binghamton University [lewcassity@hotmail.com] 
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy meeting with the 
American Philological Association January 9 2010, Anaheim 
  
 In the Republic Socrates states that there will be “no cessation of evils in cities” until 
philosophers become kings (473d5). In the Laws Socrates’ provocative claim is revised to fit the 
more moderate and traditional context of the later dialogue. The Athenian Stranger reformulates 
Socrates’ statement in the following way: “there can be no rest from evils and toils for those 
cities in which some mortal rules rather than a god (theos) . . . [so] we should obey whatever 
within us partakes of immortality, giving the name “law” (nomos) to the distribution ordained by 
intelligence (tēn tou nou dianomēn)” (713e4-714a2).2 The Athenian Stranger justifies this shift 
from the rule of philosophers to the rule of law by arguing that the nomos of the Laws is to be 
grounded in nous (957c5-7). 
 Book 10 of the Laws is intended to prove that the gods exist, care for us, and are not 
persuaded by bribes (885b7-9). The arguments put forward concerning the gods in Book 10 are 
described as “our noblest and best prelude (kalliston te kai ariston prooimion) on behalf of the 
laws” (887c1). In this paper I want to investigate how Plato establishes the fact that nous, “god, 
in the correct sense, for the gods” (897b2), exists. Some scholars have noted the “empirical” 
character of Plato’s arguments for the existence of god in Laws 10.3 While empirical facts do 
provide an important supplement to Plato’s theology, they do not comprise the whole or even 
most important part of that theology. Instead of looking at the technical or empirical arguments 
for god’s existence in Laws 10,4 I will examine how Plato’s commitment to dialogical 
conversation, where partners in logos work towards a shared understanding of the subject at 
hand,5 plays a foundational role in establishing the central principles of his theology. 
 It may seem peculiar that an emphasis on the centrality of dialogue in human life can lead 
to theological commitments of any sort, but this claim makes more sense when one examines 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Robert Guay, Randy Friedman, Anthony Preus, and Tamsin Trelawny-Cassity for comments on 
this paper. Peter Cocozzella, Robert Guay, Anthony Preus, and Andrew Scholtz were kind enough to study the 
text of Laws 10 with me during the summer of 2008, and I am grateful for their insights and dialogue. 
2 Unless otherwise noted I am using the translation by Thomas Pangle, The Laws of Plato (University of Chicago: 
Chicago, 1980). For the Greek I am using John Burnet, Platonis Opera (Oxford: 1907), but I have also benefited 
from E. B. England’s The Laws of Plato (University of Manchester: Manchester, 1921) and Peter Steiner’s 
Platon: Nomoi X (Akademie Verlag: 1992). 
3 For a lucid account of how Greek philosophers used the gods to explain natural phenomena, see L. P. Gerson, 
God and Greek Philosophy (Routledge: London, 1990). Eventually, however, doubt concerning the gods of the 
polis led to disbelief in the celestial gods (Apology 26d-e; Clouds 380). In “Plato: The Creator of Natural 
Theology,” International Studies in Philosophy 36:1 (2004) : 103-127, Gerard Naddaf notes, “in my opinion, 
Plato’s greatest achievement is that all of the arguments that he employs in his proof of the existence of god are 
empirical; he relies neither on a demiurge, nor on the world of intelligible forms” : 119.  
4 This has already been well done by others: Gerard Naddaf, “Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology”; John J. 
Cleary, “The role of theology in Plato’s Laws” in Plato’s Laws and its historical significance, ed. F. L. Lisi 
(2001): 125-140; Robert Mayhew, Plato: Laws 10 (Claredon Press: Oxford, 2008). 
5 My language and interpretation are here influenced by Gadamer’s early work Plato’s Dialectical Ethics (Yale 
University Press: New Haven, 1991), originally written in 1931. For a good discussion of dialogue in the Laws 
see Christopher Gill, “The Laws—Is it a real dialogue?” in Plato’s Laws: From Theory to Practice (Academia 
Verlag, 2003): 42-47. Leo Strauss is probably right to characterize the level of dialectic in the Laws as “sub-
Socratic,” The Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1975): 17.  
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two central tenets of Plato’s theology: the priority of soul to matter and the existence of nous, a 
term which is used synonymously with theos. By engaging partisans of ancestral piety and 
scientific materialism in dialogue, Plato gets each party to agree to view the other as an ensouled 
being capable of engaging in logos. Here, the soul, taken as an entity that can give and respond 
to reasons, is shown to have a phenomenological priority to matter. Nous in its most exalted 
sense is the orderer of the cosmos, but it is also the virtue, Reason, by which human beings orient 
themselves in the world.6 Plato shows through the dialogue of Laws 10 that human beings are 
able to orient themselves by nous through dialogical logos. Showing that nous exists as a 
constant possibility of human conversation and collective deliberation falls short of a deductive 
proof of the existence of either a cosmic demiurge or a traditional civic god. Nonetheless, this 
dialogical evidence of nous in human conversation is the essential starting point and core of 
Plato’s theology. 
 
Problems with Empirical Proofs in the Laws: 
 Empirical arguments, that is, arguments that appeal to sense experience or perception for 
support, do not form the heart of the theology of Laws 10 because the Athenian rejects such 
arguments when they are offered by his Cretan interlocutor Kleinias. In response to those who 
doubt the existence of the gods, Kleinias argues: “First, there’s the earth, the sun, the stars, and 
all things, and this beautiful orderliness (diakekosmēmena kalōs) of the seasons, divided into 
years and months” (886a2-4). Kleinias’ response is an empirically grounded version of 
cosmological-teleological argument. Robert Mayhew, like Gerard Naddaf, expresses the 
reasonable view that Plato’s own position “has a lot in common with what Kleinias presents 
here.”7 However, the Athenian replies to Kleinias, 
Now the arguments (logoi) of such men work (exergazdontai) the following effect: 
when you and I adduce evidence (tekmēria) that the gods exist, bringing forward these 
very things—sun and moon and stars and earth—as being gods and divine things, those 
who are convinced by these wise men would say that these things are earth and stones, 
and incapable of thinking anything about human affairs, however well decked-out 
(peripepemmena) they may somehow be, with arguments (logoisi) that make them 
plausible. (886d3-e2)8 
 
The wise men are not susceptible to Kleinias’ cosmological-teleological logos because they are 
under the sway of a particular logos that treats theological arguments with suspicion.9 This 
suspicion renders them insusceptible to the “empirical” evidence (tekmēria) offered by Kleinias. 
                                                
6 See Stephen Menn’s Plato on God as Nous (Southern Illinois University Press: Carbondale, 1995) for an 
excellent discussion of Plato’s view of nous. Menn argues that nous is primarily to be understood as a virtue (20) 
and should be translated as “Reason” not “mind.” Menn also argues that nous and the demiurge are the same 
entity and, therefore, nous is an efficient as well as formal cause (43ff). In this essay, I am only examining nous 
as a self-subsisting entity that souls can take up to orient themselves in the world. By taking up nous, souls 
become demiurgic, efficient causes, and nous is thereby a remote efficient cause. I will avoid the more troubling 
claim that nous can directly be an efficient cause, which would entail a complex discussion of whether the 
demiurge and nous have souls.  
7 Plato: Laws 10: 62. 
8 I have emended the first sentence of Pangle’s translation here. 
9 See LSJ on peripessō: A. bake a crust round : only metaph., disguise, “onomati p. tēn mochthērian” Ar.Pl.159 ; 
“p. autas prosthetois” deck themselves out. with false hair, Id.Fr.321 ; “peplasmenōs to pragma p.” . Bato 7.6 ; 
“p. ablabōs,” cover over Marius without hurting him, Plu.Mar.37 . . . also “rēmatiois periphtheis” cajoled by 
words, Ar.V.668. 
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This passage shows that assessing the existence of god cannot proceed merely by the 
presentation of particular empirical facts, for particular empirical facts are only intelligible in 
light of a more general explanatory logos at work in a human soul. The first step to revising the 
corrupting atheistic logos is to remove the wise men’s distrust and suspicion.10 
 
Thumos and Inauthentic Speech: 
 After introducing Kleinias to the atheistic arguments and securing Kleinias’ enthusiastic 
consent to provide arguments for the existence of the gods as part of their overall legislative 
endeavor (887b1-c4), the Athenian engages in a puzzling digression on thumos (anger or 
spiritedness) (887c5-888a6).11 Thumos is a great obstacle to dialogue (888a6),12 and Plato works 
in this section to free his interlocutors from this emotion in order to enter into an open 
discussion. While the discussion of thumos may have rhetorical or political implications, it also 
presents a methodological view of what counts as adequate knowledge. Analyzing an emotion 
similar to thumos, phthonos (envy), Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, 
The claim to knowledge is confirmed by arrival at a shared understanding. The other 
person’s  agreement is the test of whether the logos that is given is really able to 
expound the facts of the  matter in a convincing way. But here we find a specific 
possibility of inauthenticity to which speech, as a possibility of human existence, is 
subject . . . [true shared understanding requires] the exclusion of phthonos. Phthonos . . . 
means concern about being ahead of others or not being left behind by others. As such, 
its effect in conversation is to cause an apprehensive holding back from talk that presses 
toward discovering the true state of affairs.13 
In weaning his interlocutors from self-interested emotions like anger and jealousy, Plato subtly 
directs them towards the true standard of knowledge in human life: open dialogue guided by 
nous.  
 Plato, of course, is well aware of the danger and difficulty of open dialogue about the 
gods. To those who would simply legislate against punishing heretics, the Athenian argues for 
dispassionate discussion: 
Yet it must be dared (tolmēteon). For it shouldn’t be that both are maddened at the same 
time, at least, some of us by gluttony for pleasure, and others by spirited anger 
(thumousthai) at such men. Let some such preliminary speech as the following proceed, 
without spiritedness (athumos), for those who are thus corrupted in their thinking, and 
let’s speak gently, quenching spiritedness (thumos), as if we were carrying on a 
dialogue (dialegomenoi) with one such man. (888a2-7). 
                                                
10 At this section of the dialogue, the atheists consider their position to be the “greatest prudence” (megistē 
phronēsis) (886b7-8). This characterization is important, for the atheists believe that by not being taken in by the 
arguments of the religious they are not only showing intellectual wisdom but also looking out for their own well-
being. 
11 Robert Mayhew holds that Kleinias, Megillus, and the Athenian have a right to be angry at the atheists (Plato: 
Laws 10 : 73). Thomas Pangle argues that thumos is an important part of civic life, especially war and 
punishment. (“The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s Laws,” The American Political Science Review. 
Vol. 70, 1976 : 1059-1077, here p. 1061.” 
12 The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s Laws”: 1061-1062. 
13 Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: 44-45. While the Philebus, the subject of Gadamer’s interpretation here, and the Laws 
differ stylistically, they are both typically classified as late works. My analysis here also points to a thematic 
similarity. 
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The characterization of the Athenian’s dialectical engagement with the atheists as tolmēros is 
fitting, for it is both brave and bordering on the transgressive. While commitment to the 
principles of open dialogue will loosen the atheist’s unthinking commitment to his materialist 
explanation of the cosmos, Kleinias, Megillus, and the future citizens of Magnesia will be 
reciprocally exposed to the atheist’s arguments. Dialectics are just as much a threat to traditional 
piety as to atheism.14 
  After stating the prerequisites for a true dialogue, the Athenian conjures up a young 
atheist to engage in dialogue.15 Far from encouraging the young atheist to quickly change his 
opinion to a pious one on the basis of some empirical considerations, the Athenian notes the 
transience of all human opinion and states: 
If you should be persuaded by me, you’ll wait (perimeneis) until you have a doctrine 
(dogma) about these matters that has become as clear as it can be, and meanwhile you’ll 
investigate (anaskopōn) whether things are thus or otherwise, and will inquire 
(punthanomenos) from  others, and especially the lawgiver. (888c7-d2, cf. 888b2) 
The Athenian’s recommendation, far from imposing his own theistic dogma on the young 
atheist, is to perimenein and to investigate para te tōn allōn (with others). Far from being an 
exhortation to orthodoxy, this section of the Laws advocates epochē and shared dialectical 
inquiry.  
 
Tuchē and Dianoia: 
 After these methodological exhortations about how to proceed in an open dialogue, the 
Athenian accords the atheists’ argument more respect than before (888d8, cf. 887e8). The 
Athenian has drawn Kleinias and Megillus into a situation where they must take the atheistic 
position seriously. The Athenian says, “certain people say that all affairs (ta pragmata) come 
into being, have come into being, and will come into being, by nature (phusei), by art (technēi), 
and through chance (dia tuchēn)” (888e4-6). In response, Kleinias replies, “Isn’t that finely 
expressed?” Like the young atheist, the old Kleinias is quick to reach an opinion about the 
greatest matters, but the Athenian replies that they should “investigate (skepsōmetha) whatever it 
is those people over there happen to think (tugchanousi dianooumenoi)” (888e7-889a2). In 
addition to reminding Kleinias, as he did the young atheist, to thoroughly investigate arguments 
before believing them, this passage foreshadows an important criticism of the atheists’ beliefs. 
Those responsible for the atheistic doctrine happen or chance (tugchanein) to think the way they 
do.  
 Plato links the atheists’ thinking with chance (tuchē) in two ways. First, because the 
atheists hold that random matter in motion precedes soul, thinking itself has to be a product of 
chance.16 Second, the atheists’ thinking is rooted in chance because it does not engage in open 
dialogue with opposing viewpoints. Open discussion is the only way of securing knowledge, and 
                                                
14 See also the use of dialegomenon and its close proximity to philosophein at 857d2-3; it is characteristic of the 
Laws to note the importance of dialogue and philosophy as goals for human conduct, even though the level of 
discourse in the Laws often fails to enact these standards.  
15 Although the young atheists in Book 10 are specific to that book, the Athenian has used the device of a young 
objector to the legislation elsewhere, compare 839b4. 
16 Compare Descartes’ Mediation One: “According to their supposition [those who deny the existence of god], 
then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other 
means; yet since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, 
the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time” (trans. Cottingham, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2006) : 14. 
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any form of speech which refuses this cannot lay claim to being free from arbitrariness. Both 
ancestral piety and Presocratic materialism, therefore, are merely arbitrary viewpoints 
determined by chance until they engage in critical dialogue.17  
 By examining Plato’s linkage of the dianoia of the atheists with tuchē, we reach the heart 
of his criticism of the atheists. Rather than call forward empirical evidence, such as the motion of 
the stars, to counteract the logos of the atheists, the Athenian tries to bring to their attention that 
on which their logos depends: soul. The teaching of the atheists seeks to make a sharp distinction 
between the works of nature and the works of art (or design) and to accord a greater value on the 
former than the latter:18  
It’s likely, they assert, that the greatest of them, and the finest, are produced 
(apergazdesthai) by nature and chance, and the smaller by art, which taking from nature 
the genesis of the greatest and first deeds (ergōn), molds and constructs all the smaller 
things which we all call artificial. (889a4-8) 
 While the atheists ascribe the outcome of natural processes to blind chance, they cannot escape 
using the soul-dependent language of craft (apergazdesthai) and rational agency (ergōn).19 
 
The Priority of the Soul: 
 After presenting the atheistic teaching, the Athenian proposes that he and Kleinias share 
in examining it together: 
But now you tell me again, Kleinias (for you must share in the arguments (tōn logōn)): 
the one saying these things ventures (kinduneuei) to hold that fire, water, earth, and air 
are the first (prōta) of all things, and ventures to name these very things “nature,” and to 
say that soul is  something that comes later, out of these things. But it’s likely that he 
doesn’t “venture,” (kinduneuein) but really makes these things manifest (sēmainein) to 
us (hēmin) in his argument (tōi logōi). (891b8-c5) 
The repetition of the verb kinduneuein in this passage carries a connotation of riskiness. The 
atheists’ thinking is risky both in that it is determined by tuchē and thus proceeds in a haphazard 
fashion, but also that it is dangerous in its effect on social norms. While the atheists hold that the 
material elements are first, they nonetheless indicate or signify (sēmainein) their thoughts to an 
audience of living beings, to us (hēmin), through a rational discourse. Through engaging this 
logos as well as getting the atheists to recognize it to be a logos and therefore dependent on soul 
will be an important part of the Athenian’s argumentation.  
 After showing that the atheists’ opinion rests on their conception of the posteriority of the 
soul to matter, the Athenian exclaims, “Haven’t we discovered something like a source (pēgēn 
tina anoētou doxēs) of the mindless opinion of those human beings who have at any time 
engaged in investigations into nature?” (891c7-9).The play on “mindless,” is derogatory, but it is 
also explanatory, for the atheists have no way to account for nous. Most commentators find the 
                                                
17 The city of Magnesia is intended to be heavily shaped by persuasive legal preludes and incantations (epōidē), but 
Plato makes clear that habitual virtue is not enough: see Book 12, 951b for the necessity of knowledge of other 
ways of life and Book 7 816d9-e2 on the necessity of comedy. For a good analysis of the role incantations in the 
Laws see Christoph Helmig, “Die Bedeutung und Funktion von epōidē in Platons Nomoi,” Plato’s Laws: From 
Theory to Practice, ed. Scolnicov and Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2003). 
18 In The Laws of Plato (University of Manchester Press, 1921), E. B. England suggests that technē be translated 
“design.” (on 888e4ff.) 
19 Seth Benardete notes well the link between technē and knowledge of causality, Plato’s “Laws : The Discovery of 
Being (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2000) : 297. To the Platonic-Aristotelian way of looking at things, 
to deny that technē is part of nature is to deny that the world can be known. 
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proof of the priority of the soul in the passage discussing the various kinds of motion (893bff), 
but the Athenian’s prefatory remarks to this proof are more important: 
The arguments which have shaped the soul of the impious (hoi tēn tōn asebōn psukēn 
apergasamenoi logoi) have asserted that what is in fact the first cause of the coming 
into being and passing away of all things is not first, but has come into being later, and 
that what in fact comes later comes earlier. That is why they have fallen into error 
concerning the real existence of the gods. (891e4-9)  
The impious’ logos states that soul is something which is fashioned (apergasamenein) out of the 
elements, but the impious are unaware that their soul-denying logos shapes, fashions, and resides 
in their own souls.20 While this argument does not affirm the priority of soul simply,21 it does 
suggest that we should start with the things that are first for us, not the things that are first 
simply.22 The appropriate starting point for a philosophical understanding of the universe, Plato 
suggests, is recognition of the fact that those doing the analyzing, human beings, are ensouled 
beings who come to know the world through logos. 
 
Crossing the River: 
 By getting the atheists to accept the phenomenological priority of soul to body Plato has 
already gone some way towards his goal of proving the priority of soul. Next, the Athenian 
Stranger embarks on a methodological digression: 
Consider therefore: suppose it was necessary for us, being three, to cross a very swift 
flowing river, and I, happening (tugchanōn) to be the youngest of us and experienced 
(empeiros) in many currents, said that I ought to try it first by myself, leaving you in 
safety and investigating whether it is fordable for more elderly (prebuterois) men such 
as you, or just how it is . . . [so] first I should question myself, while you listen in safety, 
and then, after this I again should answer myself, and go through the entire argument 
this way, until what pertains to soul is completed and it has been demonstrated that soul 
is prior to body.  (892d5-893a7) 
On the surface this passage excludes Kleinias and Megillus from active participation in the 
dialogue.23 While acknowledging the limitations of Kleinias and Megillus, however, this passage 
points to what truly counts as the most important qualification for leading a dialogue. Age 
qualifications are only a result of tuchē; what really counts is being experienced (empeiros).24 In 
an argument which is ostensibly devoted to proving that the soul is older than the body, it is both 
suggestive and ironic that the youngest member of conversation is the most adept at carrying out 
the proof. 
                                                
20 England correctly notes that “There is a lurking irony in his choice of the apergasamenoi to govern psuchē; he 
thereby calls attention to the absurdity of regarding psuchē as a “production” of dead phusis.” (on 891e7) 
21 As Aristotle notes in Metaphysics Delta chapter 11, priority admits of a variety of meanings. The Laws often 
seems to conflate temporal priority and phenomenological priority by seeking to draw a link between what is 
proteros and what is presbuteros. Gabriela Carone has suggested that presbuteros carries connotations of 
dignity, Plato’s Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimensions (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005): 165; 
while this may be true generally, the theme of old age is so prevalent in the Laws that I believe Plato uses this 
term to signify older in time. 
22 Nicomachean Ethics 1095b2-4, Physics 184aff. 
23 This of course isn’t entirely the Athenian’s fault, for Megillus at times has shown wariness in submitting to 
dialectical engagement (cf. 633a1-2).  
24 The right of the older to rule the younger is a constant topic under examination throughout the Laws. See 690aff 
where age is only one of the possible titles to rule in contrast to phronēsis which is characterized as rule kata 
phusin. 
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 While Kleinias and Megillus do not actively participate in the technical discussion 
concerning the types of motion, they do consent to the Athenian’s leadership in this difficult 
task. The river of ever-changing human experience is hard to endure,25 and after hours of 
discussion Kleinias and Megillus willingly allow the Athenian to guide the logos.26 The fact that 
the technical proof of the priority of soul to body proceeds dialogically by means of the 
Athenian’s conversation with himself shows that this form of inquiry remains at the heart of 
Platonic inquiry, even if Megillus and Kleinias have not progressed far enough to become full-
fledged participants. 
 
Which Soul Drives the Cosmos? 
 After providing arguments which putatively prove the priority of soul to the elements, the 
Athenian then asks how many souls exist (896e). Answering his own question, the Athenian 
notes that there are at least two souls. The soul does good, “every time it takes as a helper 
Intelligence (noun proslabousa)—god, in the correct sense, for the gods—it guides all things 
towards what is happy, while when it associates with lack of intelligence it produces 
(apergazdetai) in all things just the opposite to these” (897b1-5). Here, Plato identifies his true 
god as nous. While the discussion so far has affirmed the existence of souls and nous, there is 
still the question of which soul drives the cosmos.  
 Now we are at the point where Plato might be tempted to take empirical data into 
consideration, for the Athenian Stranger states that if the motion of the heavens and the motion 
of nous are similar, then the best soul is in charge of the cosmos. The Athenian asks, 
So what nature does the motion of Intelligence (nous) possess, then? Now this, friends, 
is a question that’s difficult to answer while speaking in a prudent way. That’s why it’s 
just (dikaion), at this point, for you to take me (proslambanein) as a helper in 
answering. (897d3-6) 
While this passage notes the Athenian’s inequality with his interlocutors, the language describing 
the actions of the interlocutors following the Athenian mirrors the soul’s following the 
commands of nous. While much of Laws 10 is dedicated to providing a logos about the existence 
of nous, here the interlocutors’ practical actions show in ergon that human beings are capable of 
following nous by means of rational discussion and agreement.  
 The parallel between the soul following nous and the interlocutors following the 
Athenian is followed by a reminder that empirical data is not capable of solving the problems 
that need to be worked out at the level of self-critical discussion: 
Let’s not make our reply by looking straight on, and thereby as if we were looking at 
the sun, create night at midday—because we supposed Intelligence (nous) were ever 
visible and adequately knowable by mortal eyes. One can see in more safety by looking 
at an image of what is being asked about. (897d8-e2) 
In language evoking the Phaedo (96c, 99d-100b), the Athenian notes that exclusive 
concentration on perceptual phenomenon leads to the self-forgetting of the soul.  
 Instead of focusing on empirical phenomenon, the Athenian “recollects” their earlier 
distinction between things that move in one place and things that move in many (893bff). The 
Athenian notes, 
Now of these two motions, the one that moves always in one place must necessarily 
move around some center, being an imitation (mimēma) of circular things turned on a 
                                                
25  Compare Timaeus 43a. 
26  Compare Aristotle’s quotation from Hesiod in Nicomachean Ethics 1095b10-13. 
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lathe, and it  must in every way have the greatest possible kinship and 
resemblance to the revolution of Intelligence (nous). (898a3-6)  
 
This passage, which is to prove crucial in linking the revolution of the stars to the revolution of 
nous, is surprising because the class of things revolving in one place is an imitation of the rather 
ordinary activity of a human being working some piece of wood on a lathe. Whereas one might 
think that Plato would suggest that human activity be understood in terms of celestial motion or 
abstract definitions of self-moving motion, this passage interestingly inverts the priority. The 
abstract concept of circular motion around a fixed point is only intelligible as an imitation of 
purposive human activity. That this is precisely Plato’s point is illustrated by repetition: 
Surely, if we said that moving according to what is the same, in the same way, in the 
same place, around the same things, towards the same things, and according to one 
proportion (logon) and order characterized both Intelligence and the motion that moves 
in one place—speaking of them as images (apeikasmena) of the motions of a sphere 
turned on a lathe—we’d never appear to be poor craftsmen (dēmiourgoi) of beautiful 
images in speech (logōi kalōn eikonōn). (898a8-b3) 
In noting how spherical rotation and the operation of nous are similar and can be understood as 
images of an intelligent craftsman shaping a sphere on a lathe, the Athenian and his interlocutors 
become dēmiourgoi themselves. That the dēmiourgoi of the Laws are ordinary human beings and 
not some cosmic creator is significant, especially in light of the opening question of the Laws.27 
By pointing to how the interlocutors fashion their own rational discourse by analyzing the world 
around them through the application of reason, Plato suggests the presence of the divine in 
human rationality. 
 Only now are we prepared for the “empirical” question of whether or not the heavens are 
driven around by a rational or irrational soul. Kleinias answers: 
But stranger, from what has now been said at any rate, it isn’t pious (hosion) to say 
anything other than that the soul—whether it be one or several—that has every virtue 
drives things around. (898c6-8) 
At first glance it is quite surprising, as John Cleary notes, that Kleinias “thinks that an appeal to 
piety is sufficient to settle the question in favor of a good soul.”28 Isn’t there a firmer foundation 
for the orderliness of the cosmos than this?  
 
Piety and Proof: 
 In Book 7 of the Laws the Athenian outlines the educational system of Magnesia. 
Examining some of his remarks on the study of astronomy may shed some light on why “piety” 
is an important component of Platonic cosmology. Here, the Athenian mentions a supposedly 
pious view which he considers “simply intolerable in every way”:  
With regard to the greatest god (ton megiston theon), and the cosmos as a whole, we 
assert that one should not conduct investigations nor busy oneself with trying to 
discover the causes—for it is not pious (hosion) to do so. (820e-821a4) 
This claim grounded in false piety is intolerable because human beings’ lack of astronomical 
knowledge combined with their empirical experience of the heavens has led them to think that 
the cosmos is disorderly and random.29 As Kleinias states, 
                                                
27 “Is it a god or some human being (theos ē tis anthrōpōn), strangers, who is given the credit for laying down your 
laws?” (624a). 
28 John J. Cleary, “The role of theology in Plato’s Laws”: 132. 
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For in my lifetime I myself have often seen the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and 
certain others, never going along the same course, but wandering all over the place; and 
I suppose we all know that the sun and the moon do these things all the time. (821c1-5) 
In addition to standing in contradiction with Kleinias’ attempted cosmological-teleological proof 
at 886d3-e2, this quotation shows that empirical observation of the heavens tells us nothing 
definite about the existence of nous without a proper orientation to the phenomenon under 
observation.  
 The Athenian claims in Book 7 that he has a “proof” (tekmērion) (821e3) and discusses 
the possibility of a demonstration of this proof (822b7-9). Unfortunately, however, this proof is 
not forthcoming. Instead, the Athenian abruptly and surprisingly declares that the laws 
concerning education have come to an end (822d). While later passages in the Laws assert that 
astronomy has an effect opposite to what the many believe, in that it instills a sense of wonder 
(thaumata) (967a7-d2), these passages do not contain a demonstrative proof of how an intelligent 
order underlies the sometimes wandering motions of the heavens. 
 It may be that Plato left out the proof discussed in Book 7 simply because its complexity 
was too great for the legislative-minded audience of the Laws. It seems to me, however, that 
Plato omits this proof either because he believes that the existence of nous does not need to rely 
on a highly complex technical proof or because he thinks that the existence of nous is not strictly 
demonstrable in this manner. Instead Plato relies on the sense of wonder that one experiences 
when contemplating the cosmos with an open mind (compare in this regard 893d3) and the 
existential possibility of nous coming to guide human conversation as it does over the course of 
the Laws. Openness to nous’ operation in the heavens and in conversation is not, strictly 
speaking, a logos. Instead it is a fundamental orientation to the world which in Plato’s view falls 
under the name of piety. In this way Plato suggests that piety has, for human beings, an 
existential priority to logical proof. 
 Whether Plato thought that piety, understood as affirming the phenomenological priority 
of the soul and being open to the existential possibility of nous arising in dialogical conversation, 
is enough to establish a coherent theology for Magnesia is an open question. Plato’s political 
theology draws on a great deal more than this, including religious tradition, political necessity, 
and perhaps empirical observations that were discussed in more detail in the Academy. It seems 
to me, however, that the inherent orientation of open human dialogue towards nous, and not any 
empirical observations, form the essential starting point from which any coherent elaboration of 
Platonic theology must proceed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 Compare Aristophanes’ Clouds 607ff. for a comic account of how inaccurate astronomy leads to religious 
impieties. 
